Node Name Long Name Paraphrase In-Degree Out-Degree
1D01 I Definition 1 Definition: Cause of Itself 0 3
1D02 I Definition 2 Definition: Finite in its kind 0 2
1D03 I Definition 3 Definition: Substance 0 10
1D04 I Definition 4 Definition: Attribute 0 6
1D05 I Definition 5 Definition: Mode 0 10
1D06 I Definition 6 Definition: God 0 11
1D07 I Definition 7 Definition: Free 0 3
1D08 I Definition 8 Definition: Eternity 0 5
1A01 I Axiom 1 Axiom: In itself or in another 0 8
1A02 I Axiom 2 Axiom: Not conceived through another, through itself 0 0
1A03 I Axiom 3 Axiom: Effect from cause 0 2
1A04 I Axiom 4 Axiom: Knowledge of effect from knowledge of cause 0 9
1A05 I Axiom 5 Axiom: Nothing in common, no knowledge in common 0 1
1A06 I Axiom 6 Axiom: True idea agrees with ideato 0 6
1A07 I Axiom 7 Axiom: If conceived not existing, then essence not requires existence 0 1
1P01 I Proposition 1 Substance prior to modifications 2 1
1P02 I Proposition 2 Substances with different attributes have nothing in common 1 3
1P03 I Proposition 3 Two things with nothing in common are not cause of each other 2 1
1P04 I Proposition 4 Two distinct things must have a difference of attribute or of mode 4 1
1P05 I Proposition 5 Not two substances with same nature or attribute 4 5
1P06 I Proposition 6 One substance cannot produce another 5 3
1P07 I Proposition 7 Nature of a substance is to exist. 2 7
1P08 I Proposition 8 Every substance is necessarily infinite 3 1
1P09 I Proposition 9 The more reality, the more attributes 1 0
1P10 I Proposition 10 Each attribute of a substance, conceived through itself 2 4
1P12 I Proposition 12 No attribute of substance implies substance is divisible 7 0
1P13 I Proposition 13 Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible 2 0
1P14 I Proposition 14 Besides God, no substance can be nor be conceived 3 4
1P15 I Proposition 15 Whatever is, is in God 4 17
1P16 I Proposition 16 Everything conceived by infinite intellect follows from God's nature 1 14
1P17 I Proposition 17 God acts from the laws of his own nature and is not compelled 2 2
1P17C02 I Proposition 17 Corollary 2 God alone is a free cause 6 1
1P18 I Proposition 18 God is the immanent cause of all things 4 0
1P19 I Proposition 19 God is eternal; all His attributes are eternal 5 2
1P20 I Proposition 20 The existence and essence or God are one and the same 3 2
1P20C02 I Proposition 20 Corollary 2 God is immutable 1 2
1P21 I Proposition 21 What follows from God's nature is infinite and exists forever 3 6
1P22 I Proposition 22 What follows from an attribute as modified, exists forever and is infinite 1 2
1P23 I Proposition 23 Every mode which exists infinitely follows from an attribute or an infinite mode 5 1
1P24 I Proposition 24 The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence 1 1
1P25 I Proposition 25 God is the efficient cause of the existence and essence of things 2 3
1P25C01 I Proposition 25 Corollary Individual things are modifications or modes of God's attributes 3 9
1P26 I Proposition 26 God and only God can determine a thing to action 2 2
1P27 I Proposition 27 A thing determined to an action by God cannot become indeterminate 1 1
1P28 I Proposition 28 Finite things determined to actions by other finite things 8 7
1P29 I Proposition 29 In Nature is nothing contingent 6 6
1D09 I Proposition 29 Definition Natura naturans/Natura naturata 0 0
1P30 I Proposition 30 Actual intellect comprehends attributes of God 3 1
1P31 I Proposition 31 The actual intellect must be referred to natura naturata 4 0
1P32 I Proposition 32 The will cannnot be a free cause 3 2
1P32C02 I Proposition 32 Corollary 2 Will and intellect related as motion and rest 2 0
1P33 I Proposition 33 Things are produced by God in the only possible order. 4 2
1P34 I Proposition 34 The power of God is His essence itself 3 4
1P35 I Proposition 35 Whatever we conceive to be in God's power necessarily exists 1 1
1P36 I Proposition 36 Nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow 3 2
1P06C01 I Proposition 6 Corollary 1 There is nothing by which substance can be produced 4 1
1P14C01 I Proposition 14 Corollary 1 No substance is divisible 2 5
1P14C02 I Proposition 14 Corollary 2 Thinking things and extended things are attributes or modifications of God 2 0
1P16C01 I Proposition 16 Corollary 1 God is cause of himself, not through anything contingent 1 2
1P17C01 I Proposition 17 Corollary 1 God acts only through the perfection of His nature 1 0
1P20C01 I Proposition 20 Corollary 1 The existence of God is an eternal truth 1 0
1P24C01 I Proposition 24 Corollary 1 God the cause of continued existence of things 2 2
1P32C01 I Proposition 32 Corollary 1 God does not act from freedom of will 1 0
2D01 II Definition 1 Definition 'Body' 0 1
2D02 II Definition 2 Definition of 'Essence' 0 3
2D03 II Definition 3 Definition of 'Idea' 0 0
2D04 II Definition 4 Definition of 'Adequate Idea' 0 2
2D05 II Definition 5 Definition of 'Duration' 0 0
2D06 II Definition 6 Definition of 'Reality' and 'Perfection' 0 2
2D07 II Definition 7 Definition of 'Individual Things' 0 0
2A01 II Axion 1 Essence of man does not involve existence 0 2
2A02 II Axion 2 Man thinks 0 1
2A03 II Axion 3 Modes of thought such as love, desire, or the emotions do not exists unless an idea of what is loved or desired also exists, but not conversely 0 2
2A04 II Axion 4 We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways 0 1
2A05 II Axion 5 No individual things are felt except bodies and modes of thought 0 1
2P01 II Proposition 1 Thought is an attribute of God; or God is a thinking thing 3 2
2P02 II Proposition 2 Extension is an attribute of God; or God is an extended thing 3 0
2P03 II Proposition 3 In god exists the idea of his essence and of all things that follow from it. 4 6
2P04 II Proposition 4 The idea of God can be one only 2 0
2P05 II Proposition 5 Formal being of ideas recognizes God as cause only qua thinking being. 4 0
2P06 II Proposition 6 Modes of an attribute have God as cause only under that attribute 2 7
2P07 II Proposition 7 The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. 1 14
2P07C01 II Proposition 7 Corollary 1 God's power of thinking is equal to his power of acting 1 5
2P08 II Proposition 8 The ideas of non-existent things are comprehended in the infinite idea of God 1 1
2P08C01 II Proposition 8 Corollary 1 Individual things do not exist unless in God's attributes 1 6
2P09 II Proposition 9 Individual thing has god for a cause only as affected by another thing 4 7
2P09C01 II Proposition 9 Corollary 1 A knowledge of everything in an individual object exists in God so far as he possesses the idea of the object 1 3
2P10 II Proposition 10 The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man 3 1
2P10C01 II Proposition 10 Corollary 1 Essence of man consists of modifications of God's attributes 3 2
2P11 II Proposition 11 The actual being of the human mind is the idea of an individual thing actually existing 7 11
2P11C01 II Proposition 11 Corollary 1 Human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God 1 15
2P12 II Proposition 12 Whatever happens in the object of the human mind is perceived by the mind 4 9
2P13 II Proposition 13 The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body 6 14
2P13C01 II Proposition 13 Corollary 1 Man is composed of mind and body, and the body exists as we perceive it 1 0
2O01 II Postulate 1 Human body composed of a number of individual, composite parts 0 2
2O02 II Postulate 2 Some body parts are fluid, some soft, some hard 0 0
2O03 II Postulate 3 The parts of the body are affected by external bodies 0 4
2O04 II Postulate 4 The human body needs for its preservation many other bodies 0 2
2O05 II Postulate 5 A fluid part imprints upon a soft part 0 1
2O06 II Postulate 6 The body can move and arrange external bodies 0 2
2P14 II Proposition 14 The human mind is adapted to the perception of many things 3 2
2P15 II Proposition 15 The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is composed of many ideas 4 1
2P16 II Proposition 16 The idea of every way in which human body is affected involves the nature of the body and external body 2 13
2P16C01 II Proposition 16 Corollary 1 The human mind perceives the nature of many bodies and of its own body 1 2
2P16C02 II Proposition 16 Corollary 2 The ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body 1 5
2P17 II Proposition 17 The mind will regard as present and existing whatever affects its body 3 17
2P17C01 II Proposition 17 Corollary 1 The mind can contemplate external things when they are no longer present 4 4
2P18 II Proposition 18 When the mind is affected by two bodies, imagining one causes remembering the other 1 7
2P19 II Proposition 19 The human mind does not know the human body itself except through ideas of the body's modifications 8 5
2P20 II Proposition 20 There exists in God the idea of the human mind, related to Him as is the idea of the human body 5 3
2P21 II Proposition 21 God's idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body 2 3
2P22 II Proposition 22 The human mind perceives both the modifications of the body and also the ideas of those modifications 4 3
2P23 II Proposition 23 The mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of modifications of the body 6 5
2P24 II Proposition 24 The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts of the body 8 2
2P25 II Proposition 25 The idea of each modification of the body does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external body 3 4
2P26 II Proposition 26 The human mind perceives no external body as existing except through ideas of modifications of its body 4 4
2P26C01 II Proposition 26 Corollary 1 Insofar as the human mind imagines an external body, insofar it has not an adequate knowledge of it. 1 0
2P27 II Proposition 27 The idea of any modification of the body does not inolve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself 2 3
2P28 II Proposition 28 The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in the human mind, are not clear and distinct 4 2
2P29 II Proposition 29 The idea of the idea of a modification of the body does not inolve an adequate knowledge of the mind 3 2
2P29C01 II Proposition 29 Corollary 1 The mind, when it perceives things in the order of Nature, has no adequate knowledge 7 1
2P30 II Proposition 30 We can have only an inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body 5 0
2P31 II Proposition 31 We can have only an inadequate knowledge of the duration of external things 1 1
2P32 II Proposition 32 All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true 2 5
2P33 II Proposition 33 In ideas, there is nothing positive on account of which they are called false 2 2
2P34 II Proposition 34 Every idea in us which is absolute, that is to say adequate and perfect, is true 2 2
2P35 II Proposition 35 Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge involved in mutilated and confused ideas 1 3
2P36 II Propositon 36 Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate ideas 6 0
2P37 II Proposition 37 What is common to everything and equally in part and whole forms the essence of no individual thing 1 1
2P38 II Proposition 38 What is equally in part and whole can only be adequately conceived 7 6
2P38C01 II Proposition 38 Corollary 1 Some ideas are common to all men, and must be clearly and distinctly perceived by all 1 0
2P39 II Proposition 39 The mind will have an adequate idea of what is common and proper to the human body 4 1
2P39C01 II Proposition 39 Corollary 1 The more things the body has in common with other bodies, the more the mind will be adapted to perceive 1 0
2P40 II Proposition 40 The consequences of adequate ideas are adequate 1 13
2D08 II Definition 8 Definition of Knowledge from vague experience (2P40Note2) 0 0
2D09 II Definition 9 Definition of Knowledge of the first kind (2P40Note2) 0 0
2D10 II Definition 10 Definition of Reason, or knowledge of the second kind(2P40Note2) 0 0
2D11 II Definition 11 Definition of Intuitive Science or knowledge of the third kind (2P40Note2) 0 0
2P41 II Proposition 41 Knowledge of the first kind is the cause of falsity; others, true 2 5
2P42 II Proposition 42 Knowledge of the second kind teach us to distinguish true from false 1 0
2P43 II Proposition 43 Whoever has a true idea knows that he has a true idea and cannot doubt the truth of the thing 3 6
2P44 II Proposition 44 It is not the nature of reason to consider things as contingent, but as necessary 3 3
2P44C01 II Proposition 44 Corollary 1 Through imagination alone we regard things as contingent 3 0
2P44C02 II Proposition 44 Corollary 2 It is the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity 6 2
2P45 II Proposition 45 Every idea of any body or actually existing individual thing involves the eternal essence of God 5 2
2P46 II Proposition 46 The knowledge of God's essence which idea involves is adequate and perfect 2 3
2P47 II Proposition 47 The human mind possess an adequate knowledge of the eternal essence of God 7 4
2P48 II Proposition 48 In the mind there is no free will 3 2
2P49 II Propostion 49 Volition or affirmation and negation except what an idea involves 3 1
2P49C01 II Proposition 49 Corollary 1 The will and the intellect are one and the same 2 0
2P06C01 II Proposition 6 Corollary 1 Formal being of things not modes of thought but as shown 1 1
2A06 II Axiom 6 When body a affects body b, all modes follow from nature of a and b (Axiom 1 After 2 Lemma 3) 0 4
2A07 II Axion 7 When a body strikes against another, angle of reflection equals angle of incidence (Axiom 2 After II Lemma 3) 0 2
2A08 II Axion 8 Changability of bodies depends on adjoining surfaces (Axiom 3 After Lemma 3) 0 0
2D12 II Definition 12 Definition of 'Mutually United' (After Lemma 3) 0 2
2P31C01 II Proposition 31 Corollary 1 All individual things are contingent and corruptible 3 0
3D01 III Definition 1 Adequate/Inadequate cause: effect clearly understood by means of the cause 0 9
3D02 III Definition 2 We act when we are adequate cause 0 11
3D03 III Definition 3 Emotion: modifications of the body that alter the power of acting 0 3
3O01 III Postulate 1 The human body can be affected in many ways that alter its power of acting 0 2
3O02 III Postulate 2 The human body is capable of suffering many changes and retaining traces of objects 0 0
3P01 III Proposition 1 Our mind acts at times and at times suffers 5 9
3P01C01 III Proposition 1 Corollary 1 Mind subject to passions in proportion to its inadequate ideas; it acts in proportion to adequate ideas 1 0
3P02 III Proposition 2 The body cannot determine the mind to thought; nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest 3 0
3P03 III Proposition 3 The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; passive states depend on inadequate ideas 6 19
3P04 III Proposition 4 A thing cannot be destroyed except by an external cause 0 7
3P05 III Proposition 5 Insofar as one thing is able to destroy another, they are of contary natures 1 5
3P06 III Proposition 6 Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persevere in its being 4 9
3P07 III Proposition 7 The effort by which each thing endeavors to persevere in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself 3 21
3P08 III Proposition 8 The effort by which each thing endeavors to persevere in its own being does not involve finite but indefinite time 1 1
3P09 III Proposition 9 The mind endeavors to persevere in its being for an indefinite time, and is conscious of this effort 4 12
3P10 III Proposition 10 There can be no idea in the mind which excludes the existence of the body, for such an idea is contrary to the mind 5 0
3P11 III Proposition 11 If anything increases, helps, or limits our body's power of action, the idea of that thing increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our mind's power of thought. 2 27
3P12 III Proposition 12 The mind endeavors as much as possible to imagine those things which increase or assist the body's power of acting 6 7
3P13 III Proposition 13 Whenever the mind imagines those things which lessen or limit the body's power of action, it endeavors as much as possible to recollet what excludes the existence of those things 2 25
3P13C01 III Proposition 13 Corollary 1 The mind is averse to imagine those things which lessen or hinder its power and that of the body 1 2
3P14 III Proposition 14 If the mind at any time has been simultaneously affected by two emotions, whenever it is afterwards affected by one, it will be affected by the other 3 2
3P15 III Proposition 15 Anything may be accidentally the cause of joy, sorrow, or desire 2 4
3P15C01 III Proposition 15 Corollary 1 The fact that we have contemplated a thing with an emotion of joy or sorrow, of which it is not the efficient cause, is a sufficient reason for being able to love or hate it 6 2
3P16 III Proposition 16 We will love or hate whatever resembles something that usually affects the mind with joy or sorrow 3 3
3P17 III Proposition 17 If we imagine that x usually affects us with sorrow and x resembles y, which affects equally with joy, we shall both love and hate x. 2 1
3P18 III Proposition 18 A man is affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same joy or sorrow as the image of a present thing. 4 2
3P19 III Proposition 19 He who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will sorrow; imagining it preserved, will rejoice 4 4
3P20 III Proposition 20 He who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice 3 2
3P22 III Proposition 22 If we imagine that a person affects with joy a thing we love, we shall be affected with love toward him 2 1
3P23 III Proposition 23 If we imagine what we hate is affected with sorrow, we will rejoice. Our emotions are inversely proportional to the joy or sorrow in the hated object. 3 3
3P21 III Proposition 21 He who imagines that what he loves is affected with joy or sorrow will also be affected with joy or sorrow, and these emotions will be proportional to their status in the beloved. 2 5
3P24 III Proposition 24 If we imagine that a person affects with joy a thin we hate, we are affected with hatred toward him, and conversely 2 1
3P25 III Proposition 25 We endeavor to affirm, both concerning ourselves and the beloved object, which we imagine will affect us or the object with joy; and conversely 5 1
3P26 III Proposition 26 If we hate a thing, we endeavor to affirm concerning it whatever will affect it with sorrow, and to deny what will give it joy 1 2
3P27 III Proposition 27 Although we may not have been moved toward a thing by any emotion, if it is like ourselves, we will echo its emotions 2 9
3P27C01 III Proposition 27 Corollary 1 If a person produces joy in a thing like us, we will be affected with love toward him; and conversely 1 1
3P27C02 III Proposition 27 Corollary 2 If we pity a thing, the fact that its misery affects us with sorrow will not make us hate it 1 0
3P27C03 III Proposition 27 Corollary 3 If we pity a thing, we shall endeavor as much as possible to free it from its misery 4 1
3P28 III Proposition 28 We endeavor to bring into existence everything which we imagine conduces to joy and to remove or destroy what is opposed to it 7 8
3P29 III Proposition 29 We shall endeavor to do everything which we imagine men will look upon with joy, and conversely 2 4
3P30 III Proposition 30 If a person has done anything which he imagines will affect other with joy, he will be joyful, and ill think himself as cause 3 4
3P31 III Proposition 31 If we imagine others love what we love, we will love those things more steadily, and conversely 2 4
3P31C01 III Proposition 31 Corollary 1 Each man endeavors to make others love what he loves and hate what he hates. 3 1
3P32 III Proposition 32 If we imagine a peson enjoys a thing that only one can possess, we will try to prevent his possessing it. 2 1
3P33 III Proposition 33 If we love something like ourselves, we strive to make it love us in return 3 3
3P34 III Proposition 34 The greater the emotion with which we imagine a beloved object is affected by us, the greater will be our self-exaltation 4 2
3P35 III Proposition 35 If I love x, and y love x more, I will hate x and envy y. 8 1
3P36 III Proposition 36 Whoever recollects a thing with which he was once delighted will wish to possess it with every condition that existed formerly 2 1
3P36C01 III Proposition 36 Corollary 1 If a lover discovers that one condition is missing, he will be sad 2 0
3P37 III Proposition 37 The desire which springs from sorrow or joy, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater 4 7
3P38 III Proposition 38 If we cease to love something, we will hate it more than if we had never loved it. 8 1
3P39 III Proposition 39 If a man hates another, he will endeavor to do him evil unless he fears a greater evil will arise for himself; and conversely 3 5
3P40 III Proposition 40 If we imagine that we are hated by another without having given him cause, we shall hate him in return 2 5
3P40C01 III Proposition 40 Corollary 1 If x love y and imagines that y hates x, we will be agitated with both love and hatred 1 0
3P40C02 III Proposition 40 Corollary 2 If we imagine that an evil has been brought on us by a man toward who we have had no emotion, we will try to return evil to him 2 0
3P41 III Proposition 41 If we imagine we are beloved without having cause, we shall love him in return 1 3
3P41C01 III Proposition 41 Corollary 1 If we imagine we are loved by someone we hate, we will be agitated by both love and hatred 1 0
3P42 III Proposition 42 If, moved by lover or hope of self-exaltation, we have conferred a favor, we shall be sad if we see the favor is received with ingratitude 5 1
3P43 III Proposition 43 Hatred is increased through return of hatred, but may be destroyed by love 6 1
3P44 III Proposition 44 Hatred which is altogether overcome by love passes into love, and love is therefore greater than hatred had not preceded it. 3 1
3P45 III Proposition 45 If we imagine that any one like ourselves is affected with hatred toward an object like ourselves which we love, we shall hate him. 3 0
3P46 III Proposition 46 If we have been affected with joy or sorrow by a foreigner, and if our joy or sorrow is accompanied with the idea of this person as cause, we love no only him, but the nation to which he belongs 1 0
3P47 III Proposition 47 The joy which arises from our imagining that what we hate has been destroyed or has been injured is not unaccompanied with some sorrow 1 0
3P48 III Proposition 48 Love and hatred toward any object are destroyed if the love or hatred be joined to the idea of another cause. 1 3
3P49 III Proposition 49 For the same reason, love or hatred toward an object we imagine to be free must be greater than toward an object under necessity 3 1
3P50 III Proposition 50 Anything may be accidentally the cause either of hope or fear 2 0
3P51 III Proposition 51 Different men may be affected by one and the same object in different ways, and the same may be affected differently at different times. 2 1
3P52 III Proposition 52 An object which we have seen before together with other objects, or which is very like them, will not be comtemplated as much as something peculiar 1 0
3P53 III Proposition 53 When the mind contemplates itself and its own power of acting, it rejoices; and it rejoices in proportion to the distinctness with which it imagines itself and its power of action 3 4
3P53C01 III Proposition 53 Corollary 1 The more a man imagines that he is praised by others, the more is his joy strengthened. 3 0
3P54 III Proposition 54 The mind endeavors to imagine those things only which posit its power of acting 1 1
3P55 III Proposition 55 When the mind imagines its own weakness, it necessarily sorrows 2 4
3P55C01 III Proposition 55 Corollary 1 This sorrow is strengthened in proportion as the mind imagines itself blamed by others 5 0
3P55C02 III Proposition 55 Corollary 2 Noone envies the virtue of a person who is not his equal 4 0
3P56 III Proposition 56 There are as many kinds of emotions or derivitives of joy, sorrow and desire, as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected 6 1
3P57 III Proposition 57 The emotion of one person differs from the corresponding emotion of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the other 3 0
3P58 III Proposition 58 Besides the joys and sorrows which are passive, there are other emotions of joy and sorrow which are related to us in so far as we act. 5 1
3P59 III Proposition 59 Among the emotions which are related to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none which are not related to joy or desire 3 7
3E01 III Definition of Emotions 1 Definition of desire 0 5
3E02 III Definition of Emotions 2 Definition of joy 0 2
3E03 III Definition of Emotions 3 Definition of sorrow 0 2
3E04 III Definition of Emotions 4 Definition of astonishment 0 1
3E05 III Definition of Emotions 5 Definition of contempt 0 0
3E06 III Definition of Emotions 6 Definition of love 0 4
3E07 III Definition of Emotions 7 Definition of hatred 0 3
3E08 III Definition of Emotions 8 Definition of inclination 0 0
3E09 III Definition of Emotions 9 Definition of aversion 0 0
3E10 III Definition of Emotions 10 Definition of devotion 0 0
3E11 III Definition of Emotions 11 Definition of derision 0 0
3E12 III Definition of Emotions 12 Definition of hope 0 1
3E13 III Definition of Emotions 13 Definition of fear 0 2
3E14 III Definition of Emotions 14 Definition of confidence 0 0
3E15 III Definition of Emotions 15 Definition of despair 0 0
3E16 III Definition of Emotions 16 Definition of gladness 0 0
3E17 III Definition of Emotions 17 Definition of remorse 0 0
3E18 III Definition of Emotions 18 Definition of commiseration 0 1
3E19 III Definition of Emotions 19 Definition of favor 0 2
3E20 III Definition of Emotions 20 Definition of indignation 0 0
3E21 III Definition of Emotions 21 Definition of overestimation 0 1
3E22 III Definition of Emotions 22 Definition of contempt 0 1
3E23 III Definition of Emotions 23 Definition of envy 0 2
3E24 III Definition of Emotions 24 Definition of compassion 0 0
3E25 III Definition of Emotions 25 Definition of self-satisfaction 0 2
3E26 III Definition of Emotions 26 Definition of humility 0 1
3E27 III Definition of Emotions 27 Definition of repentance 0 1
3E28 III Definition of Emotions 28 Definition of pride 0 3
3E29 III Definition of Emotions 29 Definition of despondency 0 1
3E30 III Definition of Emotions 30 Definition of self-exaltation 0 3
3E31 III Definition of Emotions 31 Definition of shame 0 0
3E32 III Definition of Emotions 32 Definition of regret 0 0
3E33 III Definition of Emotions 33 Definition of emulation 0 0
3E34 III Definition of Emotions 34 Definition of thankfulness or gratitude 0 1
3E35 III Definition of Emotions 35 Definition of benevolence 0 0
3E36 III Definition of Emotions 36 Definition of anger 0 0
3E37 III Definition of Emotions 37 Definition of vengeance 0 0
3E38 III Definition of Emotions 38 Definition of cruelty 0 0
3E39 III Definition of Emotions 39 Definition of fear 0 0
3E40 III Definition of Emotions 40 Definition of audacity 0 1
3E41 III Definition of Emotions 41 Definition of pusillanimousity 0 1
3E42 III Definition of Emotions 42 Definition of consternation 0 0
3E43 III Definition of Emotions 43 Definition of courtesy or moderation 0 0
3E44 III Definition of Emotions 44 Definition of ambition 0 0
3E45 III Definition of Emotions 45 Definition of luxuriousness 0 0
3E46 III Definition of Emotions 46 Definition of drunkenness 0 0
3E47 III Definition of Emotions 47 Definition of avarice 0 0
3E48 III Definition of Emotions 48 Definition of lust 0 0
4D01 IV Definition 1 Definition of good 0 4
4D02 IV Definition 2 Definition of evil 0 1
4D03 IV Definition 3 Definition of contingent 0 2
4D04 IV Definition 4 Definition of possible 0 1
4D05 IV Definition 5 Definition of contrary emotions 0 0
4D06 IV Definition 6 Definition of emotion felt toward a thing future, present or past 0 0
4D07 IV Definition 7 Definition of 'end for which we do something' …appetite 0 0
4D08 IV Definition 8 Defintion of virtue or power 0 8
4A01 IV Axion 1 Each thing in nature is surpassed in strength by some other thing, which can destroy it 0 2
4P01 IV Proposition 1 Nothing positive contained in a false idea is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true 4 1
4P02 IV Proposition 2 We suffer in so far as we are a part of nature, which part cannot be conceived by itself nor without other parts 2 0
4P03 IV Proposition 3 The force by which man perseveres in existence is limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes 1 4
4P04 IV Proposition 4 It is impossible that a man not be a part of Nature and that he should suffer no changes but which follow from his own nature 7 1
4P05 IV Proposition 5 The force and increase of a passion and its perseverance in existence are not limited by the power by which we endeavor to persevere in existence, but by the power of the external cause 4 6
4P04C01 IV Proposition 4 Corollary 1 A man is always subject to passions, and he accommodates himself to it as far as the nature of things requires 1 0
4P06 IV Proposition 6 The other actions or power of a man may be so far surpassed by the force of a passion or emotion that the emotion may obstinately cling to him 2 4
4P07 IV Proposition 7 An emotion cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger emotion 6 4
4P08 IV Proposition 8 Knowledge of good or evil is nothing by an emotion of joy or sorrow in so far as we are conscious of it 6 6
4P09 IV Proposition 9 If we imagine the cause of an emotion to be actually present with us, that emotion will be stronger than if we imagined the cause not to be present 3 5
4P09C01 IV Proposition 9 Corollary 1 The image of a past or future object is weaker than the image of a present object; and ceterus paribus, the emotion toward it is weaker as well 1 2
4P10 IV Proposition 10 We are affected more strongly by a future object that we imagine is near than by one more distant, and similarly for past objects 1 1
4P11 IV Proposition 11 The emotion toward an object we imagine as necessary is stronger than toward an object possible or contingent 2 1
4P12 IV Proposition 12 The emotion toward an object we know does not exist in the present, and which we imagine as possible is stronger than the emotion toward a contingent object 3 1
4P12C01 IV Proposition 12 Corollary 1 The emotion toward an object which we know does not exist as paresnt, and which we imagine as contingent is much weaker than toward an object imagined to be present 3 1
4P13 IV Proposition 13 The emotion toward a contingent object which we know does not exist in the present is much weaker than the emotion toward a past object. 4 0
4P14 IV Proposition 14 No emotion can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil in so far as it is true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion 3 0
4P15 IV Proposition 15 Desire that arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained by many other desires 9 2
4P16 IV Proposition 16 The desire that springs from a knowledge of good and evil can be easily extinguished or restrained, insofar as this knowledge is connected with the future 2 0
4P17 IV Proposition 17 The desire that springs from a true knowledge of good and evil can be still more easily restrained when it is connected with objects which are contingent 2 0
4P18 IV Proposition 18 The desire that springs from joy, other things being equal, is stronger than that which springs from sorrow. 3 0
4P19 IV Proposition 19 According to the laws of his own nature, each person necessarily desires that which he considers to be good and avoids what he considers to be evil. 4 3
4P20 IV Proposition 20 The more a person strives and is able to seek his own profit, the more virtue does he possess; on the other hand, so far as he neglects is own profit, he is impotent 4 0
4P21 IV Proposition 21 No one can desire to be happy, to act well and live well, who does not at the same time desire to be, to act, and to live…that is, to actually exist. 2 1
4P22 IV Proposition 22 No virtue can be conceived prior to this, namely the endeavor for self-preservation 2 2
4P23 IV Proposition 23 A man cannot be absolutely said to act in conformity with virtue except in so far as he is determined because he understands 4 1
4P25 IV Proposition 25 No one endeavors to preserve his own being formt he sake of another object 3 1
4P24 IV Proposition 24 To act absolutely in conformity with virtue is, in us, nothing but acting, living, and preserving our being as reason directs from the ground of seeking our own profit. 3 6
4P26 IV Proposition 26 All efforts which we make through reason are nothing but efforts to understand; and nothing is adjudged profitable except that which conduces to understanding 7 11
4P27 IV Proposition 27 We do not know that anything is certainly good or evil except that which actually conduces to understanding, or which can prevent us from understanding 4 7
4P28 IV Proposition 28 The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God 8 4
4P29 IV Proposition 29 No individual object whose nature is altogether different from our own can either help or restrain our power of acting; absolutely nothing can be to us either good or evil unless it possesses something in common with ourselves 5 1
4P30 IV Proposition 30 Nothing can be evil through that which it possesses in common with our nature, but in so far as a thing is evil to us is it contrary to us. 4 5
4P31 IV Proposition 31 Insofar as an object agrees with our nature, is it necessarily good. 4 2
4P31C01 IV Proposition 31 Corollary 1 The more an object agrees with our nature, the more profitable it is to us…that is, the better for us. 2 3
4P32 IV Proposition 32 Insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot be said to agree in nature 2 0
4P33 IV Proposition 33 Men may differ in nature from one another insof as they are agitated by emotions which are passions and insofar also as one and the same man is agitated by passions, he is changeable and inconstant 5 1
4P34 IV Proposition 34 Insofar as men are agitated by emotions which are passions, they can be contrary to one another 8 1
4P35 IV Proposition 35 Sofar as men live in conformity with the guidance of reason, insofar only do they always necessarily agree in nature 7 4
4P35C01 IV Proposition 35 Corollary 1 There is no single thing in Nature that is more profitable to man than a man who lives according to the guidance of reason 4 3
4P35C02 IV Proposition 35 Corollary 2 When each man seeks most that which is profitable to himself, then are men most profitable to one another 4 0
4P36 IV Proposition 36 The highest good of those who follow after virtue is common to all, and all may equally enjoy it. 4 2
1P11 I Proposition 11 God, a substance, necessarily exists 7 8
4P51 IV Proposition 51 Favor is not opposed to reason but agrees with it, and may arise from it 6 0
4P38 IV Proposition 38 What disposes the human body to be affected in many ways, or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways is profitable to man. 3 5
4P39 IV Proposition 39 Whatever is effective to preserve the propostion of motion and rest which the parts of the human body bear to each other is good, and contrarywise 5 1
4P40 IV Proposition 40 Whatever conduces to the universal fellowship of men is profitable, and contrarywise 3 0
4P41 IV Proposition 41 Joy is not directly evil but good; sorrow, on the other hand, is directly evil. 2 5
4P42 IV Proposition 42 Cheerfulness can never be excessive, but is always good; melancholy, on the contrary, is always evil 3 0
4P43 IV Proposition 43 Pleasurable excitement may be excessive and an evil; and pain may be good insofar as pleasurable excitement or joy is evil 6 3
4P44 IV Proposition 44 Love and desire may be excessive 5 0
4P45 IV Proposition 45 Hatred can never be good 2 2
4P45C01 IV Proposition 45 Corollary 1 Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, revenge, and the other emotions which are related to hatred are evil. 3 3
4P45C02 IV Proposition 45 Corollary 2 Whatver we desire because we are affected by hatred is base and unjust in the State 3 0
4P46 IV Proposition 46 He who lives according to the guidance of reason strives as much as possible to repay hatred, anger, or contempt of other with love or generosity 5 0
4P47 IV Proposition 47 The emotions hope and fear cannot be good of themselves 4 0
4P48 IV Proposition 48 The emotions of overestimation and contempt are always evil 4 0
4P49 IV Proposition 49 Overestimation easily renders the man who is overestimated proud 4 0
4P50 IV Proposition 50 Pity in a man who lives according to the guidance of reason is in itself evil and unprofitable 5 1
4P59 IV Proposition 59 To all actions to which we are determined by an emotion wherein the mind is passive we may, without the emotion, be determined by reason 7 0
4P52 IV Proposition 52 Self-satisfaction may arise from reason, and the self-satisfaction alone which arises from reason is the highest that can exist 5 0
4P53 IV Proposition 53 Humility is not a virtue, that is to say, it does not spring from reason 3 0
4P54 IV Proposition 54 Repentance is not a virtue, that is to say, it does not spring from reason; on the contrary, the man who repends of what he has done is doubly writched or impotent 3 0
4P55 IV Proposition 55 The greatest pride or the greatest despondency is the greatest ignorance of one's self 2 0
4P56 IV Proposition 56 The greatest pride or despondency incates the greatest impotence of mind 4 1
4P56C01 IV Proposition 56 Corollary 1 The proud and desponding are, above all others, subject to emotions 1 0
4P57 IV Proposition 57 The proud man loves the presence of parasites or flatterers, and hates that of the noble-minded 2 0
4P58 IV Proposition 58 Self-exaltation is not opposed to reason, but may spring from it 1 0
4P60 IV Proposition 60 The desire that arises from joy or sorrow, which is related to one or to some, but not to all, the parts of the body, has no regard to the profit of the whole man 4 0
4P61 IV Proposition 61 A desire which springs from reason can never be in excess 3 0
4P62 IV Proposition 62 Insofar as the conception of an object is formed by the mind according to the dictate of reason, the mind is equally affected, whether the idea be that of something past, present, or future 4 1
4P63 IV Proposition 63 He who is led by fear and does what is good in order that he may avoid what is evil is not led by reason 3 3
4P64 IV Proposition 64 The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge 7 0
4P65 IV Proposition 65 According to the guidance of reason, of two things which are good, we shall follow the greater good, and of two evils, the lesser 1 2
4P66 IV Proposition 66 According to the guidance of reason, we shall seek the greater future good before that which is leas and present; and contrarywise 2 2
4P67 IV Proposition 67 A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is not a meditation upon death, but upon life 2 0
4P65C01 IV Proposition 65 Corollary 1 According to the guidance of reason, we shall follow a lesser evil for the sake of a greater good, and a lesser good which is the cause of a greater evil we shall neglect 1 0
4P66C01 IV Proposition 66 Corollary 1 According to the guidance of reason, we shall seek the lesser present evil which is the cause of the greater future good, and the lesser present good which is the cause of a greater future evil we shall neglect 1 0
4P68 IV Proposition 68 If men were born free, they would form no conception of good and evil so long as they were free 2 0
4P69 IV Proposition 69 The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in avoiding danger as in overcoming it 6 0
4P70 IV Proposition 70 The free man who lives amongst those who are ignorant strives as much as possible to avoid their favors 2 0
4P71 IV Proposition 71 None but those who are free are very grateful to one another 3 0
4P72 IV Proposition 72 A free man never acts deceitfully, but always honorably 2 0
4P73 IV Proposition 73 A man who is guided by reason is freer in a State where he lives according to the common laws than he is in solitude, where he obeys himself alone 2 0
4P07C01 IV Proposition 7 Corollary 1 A man is necessarily always subject to passions 1 0
4P22C01 IV Proposition 22 Corollary 1 The endeavor after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation of virtue 2 4
4P50C01 IV Proposition 50 Corollary 1 A man who lives according to the dictates of reason endeavors as much as possible to prevent himself from being touched by pity 1 0
5A01 V Axion 1 If two contrary actions be excited in the same subject, a change must necessarily take place in both, or in one, until they cease to be contrary 0 1
5A02 V Axiom 2 The power of an emotion is limited by the power of its cause, insofar as the essence of the emotion is manifested or limited by the essence of the cause itself 0 0
5P01 V Proposition 1 As thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind, exactly so are the modifications of the body or the images of things arranged and connected in the body 5 1
5P02 V Proposition 2 If we detatch a perturbation of the mind or an emotion from the thought of an external cause and connect it with other thoughts, then the love or hatred toward the external cause will be destroyed 2 0
5P03 V Proposition 3 An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it 2 0
5P04 V Proposition 4 There is no modification of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception 3 1
5P05 V Proposition 5 An emotion toward an object which we do not imagine as necessary, possible, or contingent, but which we simply imagine is, other things equal, the greatest of all 3 1
5P06 V Proposition 6 Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, so far has it greater power over the emotions, or suffers less from them. 4 0
5P07 V Proposition 7 The emotions which spring from reason or which are excited by it are, if time be taken into account, more powerful than those which are related to individual objects which we contemplate as absent 6 0
5P08 V Proposition 8 The greater the number of the causes which simultaneously concur to excite any emotion, the greater it will be 2 1
5P32C01 V Proposition 32 Corollary 1 From the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual love of God 3 2
5P33 V Proposition 33 The intellectual love of God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal 2 2
5P34 V Proposition 34 The mind is subject to emotions which are related to passions only so long at the body exists 3 1
5P34C01 V Proposition 34 Corollary 1 No love except the intellectual love is eternal 1 0
5P09 V Proposition 9 If we are affected by an emotion which is related to many and different causes which the mind contemplates at the same time with the emotion itslef, we are less injured, suffer less from it, and are less affected toward each cause 5 0
5P10 V Proposition 10 So long as we are not agitated by emotions which are contrary to our nature, do we possess the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the order of the intellect 6 1
5P11 V Proposition 11 The greater the number of objects to which an image is related, the more constant is it, or the more frequently does it present iself, and the more does it occupy the mind 1 2
5P12 V Proposition 12 The images of things are more eaily connected with those images which are related to things which we clearly and distinctly understand than with any others 3 0
5P13 V Proposition 13 The greater the number of other things with which any image is connected, the more frequently does it present itself 1 0
5P14 V Proposition 14 The mind can cause all the modifications of the body or of the images of things to be related to the idea of God 2 3
5P15 V Proposition 15 He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and loves Him better the better he understands himself and his emotions 3 2
5P16 V Proposition 16 This love of God above everything else ought to occupy the mind 3 1
5P17 V Proposition 17 God is free from passions, nor is He affected with any emotion of joy and sorrow 5 0
5P18 V Proposition 18 No man can hate God 5 2
5P18C01 V Proposition 18 Corollary 1 Love of God cannot be turned into hatred 1 0
5P19 V Proposition 19 He who loves God cannot strive that God should live him in return 2 0
5P20 V Proposition 20 This love of God cannot be defiled either by the emotion of envy or jealousy, but is the more strengthened, the more people we imagine to be connected with God by the same bond of love 6 0
5P21 V Proposition 21 The mind can imagine nothing, nor can it recollect anything that is past, except while the body exists 4 4
5P22 V Proposition 22 In God, nevertheless, there necessarily exists an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity 4 1
5P23 V Proposition 23 The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal 3 4
5P24 V Proposition 24 The more we understand individual objects, the more we understand God 1 2
5P25 V Proposition 25 The highest effort of the mind and its highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge 5 1
5P26 V Proposition 26 The better the mind is adapted to understand things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand them by this kind of knowledge 1 0
5P27 V Proposition 27 From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind 5 1
5P28 V Proposition 28 The effort or the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledgte cannot arise from the first kind, but may arise from the second kind of knowledge 2 0
5P29 V Proposition 29 Everything which the mind understands under the form of eternity, it understands not because it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but because it coneives the essence of the body under the form of eternity 6 5
5P30 V Proposition 30 Our mind, insofar as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, necessarily has aknowledge of God, and knws that it is in God and is conceived through Him 1 2
5P31 V Proposition 31 The third kind of knowledge depends upon the mind as its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal 7 1
5P32 V Proposition 32 We delight in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledgte, and our delight is accompanied with the idea of God as its cause 3 4
5P35 V Proposition 35 God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love 5 1
5P36 V Proposition 36 The intellectual love of the mind toward God is the very love with which He loves Himself, not insofar as He is infinite, but in so far as He can be manifested through the essence of the human mind considered under the form of eternity 6 2
5P36C01 V Proposition 36 Corollary 1 God, insofar as He loves Himself, love men, and consequently that the love of God toward men and the intellectual love of the mind toward God are one and the same thing 1 0
5P37 V Proposition 37 There is nothing in Nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can negate it 2 0
5P38 V Proposition 38 The more objects the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it suffers from those emotions which are evil, and the less it fears death 4 1
5P39 V Proposition 39 He who possess a body fit for many things possesses a mind of which the greater part is eternal 7 0
5P40 V Proposition 40 The more perfection a thing possesses, the more it acts and the less it suffers; and conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is 2 1
5P40C01 V Proposition 40 Corollary 1 That part of the mind which abides, whether great or small, is more perfect than the other part 5 0
5P41 V Proposition 41 Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion and absolutely everything which in the Fourth Part we have shown to be related to strength of mind and generosity 2 0
5P42 V Proposition 42 Blessedness is not the reward of virtue but is virtue itself; nor do we delight in blessedness because we restrain our lusts, but, on the contrary, because we delight in it, therefore are we able to restrain them 7 0
1P16C02 I Proposition 16 Corollary 2 God is cause through Himself, and not through that which is contingent 1 0
1P16C03 I Proposition 16 Corollary 3 God is absolutely the first cause 1 0
4P37 IV Proposition 37 The good which every one who follows after virtue seeks for himself he will desire for other men; and his desire on their behalf will be greater in proportion as he has greater knowledge of God 6 12