Research Interests and Current
Projects Accepting
Students
William Langston
Middle Tennessee State University
My research interests can be divided into a number
of
different areas. The quick links below will take you to the relevant
section of the page.
Note: Whereas I've always been interested in the topics I currently
research, this was not my actual research program. After years of
fruitless searching for an embodiment effect that would replicate, I
became convinced that the whole enterprise is an exercise in pathological
science. This led me to wonder: Why did I spend so much time
working on something in the face of pretty clear evidence that I was
wrong? At the same time, I was going out on ghost investigations and
hunts with a ghost hunting team, and I had a revelation that my
belief in embodied cognition and their belief in ghosts were
virtually indistinguishable. This led me to see value in pursuing my
interests in the psychology of belief as a research program that
might have value. There's been a lot of fumbling around trying to
get a research program started from scratch, and a lot of time has
been wasted trying to tie up loose ends from the embodied language
research (can nothing be saved?). What you see here is a
distillation of all of that fumbling into a potential research
program that will bear fruit and make a valuable contribution.
For a time, I noodled on a devastating critique of embodied
cognition. However, I have decided that nobody likes a scold, and
being one isn't going to change anyone's unshakable belief anyway.
Instead, I'll just put this here: I think there's a baby in that
embodiment bathwater. I also think there's a baby in the ghost
hunters' bathwater. The question is, should we throw those babies
out? For ghost hunting, I think I have a pretty good handle on what
the baby is (hint: it's psychology!). Is the embodiment baby the
same, or is there a core nugget of empirical reality bound up in a
tumor of Type I error and overinflated theorizing? Only time will
tell.
Applying a model for clinical
delusions to more mundane misbelief
What we're working from is a gross simplification of a model
proposed by Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington.
(2001) to explain delusions. We find their application of the model
to persecutory delusions to be particularly instructive:
Freeman, D., Garety, P. A., Kuipers,
E., Fowler,
D., & Bebbington, P. E. (2002). A cognitive model of
persecutory delusions.
British Journal of Clinical
Psychology,
41, 331-347. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/014466502760387461
An important note is that the beliefs we study are not clinical in
nature and generally do not cause distress for our participants.
This is a major departure from the realm for which the model was
developed, and might lead to important differences between what
we're studying and clinical delusions. The model does make some
specific predictions that do appear to be supported by the existing
literature on paranormal beliefs, and that serve as a useful guide
for research in the psychology of belief. Some for-instances:
The factors influencing the formation of a belief can be separated
from the factors operating to maintain and update the belief. For
formation, something happens. This experience could be a function of
the person's psychology (e.g., individuals higher in schizotypy
might be more likely to see anomalous patterns that need to be
explained) or it could be a function of the person's physical or
social environment. Variables influence the meaningfulness attached
to this experience (but not necessarily anxiety). Low tolerance for
ambiguity is probably still implicated, as is the search for
meaning. Cognitive biases associated with psychosis are probably
still implicated. Basically, the process is almost the same as
described in Freeman et al. (2002), but without the emotional
distress that drives delusion formation, and without the precursors
specific to persecutory delusions.
Once a belief exists, similar mechanisms to maintain it are probably
also involved. It would still be the case (maybe more?) that people
who experience anomalous phenomena would not want to attribute them
to some form of madness; "the knowledge that the person is not
‘losing their mind’" (p. 337). The same processes to focus on
confirmatory evidence and discount disconfirmatory evidence would
take over. Again, the negative emotional consequences are probably
not driving the bus, but a need for explanation could be. Identity
might also be involved (once the belief has been incorporated into
the self, maintaining identity is the motivating factor). As an
analogy, the belief is like an object of great mass distorting the
space around it and drawing everything that comes close into its
orbit.
What projects emerge from this?
1. The model proposes that supporting evidence will receive
privileged attention "attentional biases will come on-line, as is
found in emotional disorders: threat will be preferentially
processed" (p. 338). Research in the paranormal belief literature
also suggests that believers will attend more to information
consistent with their beliefs (or memory processes will privilege
consistent experiences; e.g., Wiseman & Morris, 1995; http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.2044-8295.1995.tb02549.x). To evaluate this, we
watched participants' eyes as they watched a video of some ghost
investigators communicating with a spirit in a cemetery. The
investigators used a pendulum that moved in specific ways in
response to questions. We expected believers to attend more to the
pendulum (the ghost's communication) and skeptics to attend more to
the hand of the person holding the pendulum (the actual source of
the motion). This did not happen. Instead, belief that the video
depicted a genuine ghost encounter influenced what participants
attended to. We did find that variables that were correlated with
prior belief did not affect the interpretation of the video,
supporting the idea of the two separate stages formation and
updating. A preliminary look at the data was provided by Hunt,
Hubbard, Anderson, Fehrman, & Langston (2016).
2. We routinely survey people attending the Shadow Chasers ghost
walks in Murfreesboro every October. Over the years, we have
collected data from hundreds of participants to evaluate personality
and other variables that might be associated with belief formation.
We also have data from one year looking at change in belief as a
result of the tour. These data also allow an evaluation of the
model's separation of formation and updating stages of belief.
3. We asked participants to use a pendulum to test whether or not a
ghost image was present in a photograph and looked at change in
belief as a function of knowledge and prior belief. Again, the
variables affecting belief change should be different from those
affecting belief formation.
What are we doing now?
1. In a project we're calling the "hail Mary," we are asking
participants about every possible form of experience that could lead
to belief to see if there are any believers who do not have an
experience (the model predicts a precipitating experience as the
foundation of belief). We are also measuring a ton of personality
variables with these participants, some of which should be
associated with belief formation and some of which should not. Will
the associations we find be consistent with the model's predictions?
2. We are trying to develop a project to change belief to evaluate a
"hail Mary" style project for the belief change stage. We've tried
astrology, and are currently looking at pyramid power. This is
proving to be labor intensive and complicated.
Back to top What
is the role of meaning threat in the formation/maintenance of
belief?
Back to top Projects aimed at understanding
the evidence in favor of various forms of misbelief
Back to top Projects
aimed at undermining claims that make mischief and are clearly
wrong